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CHAPTER 17 
State and Local Taxation 
OLIVER OLDMAN 
A. SUMMARY 
§17.1. Local tax developments. The most significant event in local 
taxation during the 1962 SURVEY year was the Bettigole case, which 
prevented the city of Springfield from assessing different classes of 
real property at different ratios of assessed value to true value. The 
case is briefly discussed below along with other 1962 property tax 
developments. 
§17.2. State tax developments. The most significant state tax legis-
lation to be adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year was the repeal of 
the corporate excess portion of the corporation excise tax. A perhaps 
more significant event was the 5-to-l defeat of the proposed constitu-
tional amendment to permit a graduated personal income tax. The 
1962 legislation is summarized at pages 9983 through 9990 of 2 CCH 
Massachusetts State Tax Reporter. A technical discussion of 1962 
legislation, prepared and made available by the Department of Corpo-
rations and Taxation, is reprinted at pages 10,412 through 10,418 of 
2 CCH Massachusetts State Tax Reporter. 
Among the several cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1962 SURVEY year the Wheatland case has 
been singled out for extensive analysis in this chapter this year. The 
case deals with the application of the personal income tax to income 
from out-of-state property. Other important cases are briefly sum-
marized. 
B. PROPERTY TAX 
§17.3. Legislation. There were about a dozen minor bills enacted 
during the 1962 SURVEY year, many of them relating to refinements 
on exemptions granted in the past. Each enactment is summarized 
briefly at page 9985 of 2 CCH Massachusetts State Tax Reporter. 
Worthy of note is the apparent increasing interest in exemptions for 
elderly persons. In such other states as Florida and New Jersey the 
exemption has caused a number of administrative difficulties without 
OLIVER OLDMAN is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Director of Train-
ing of its International Program in Taxation. 
The author wishe~ to acknowledge the assistance of John J. Sheehy and Peter 
Wells of the Board of Student Editors of the SURVEY. 
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evidence that the benefits are channeled to those among the elderly 
who need them. Relevant to this type of exemption is the constitu-
tional issue discussed below under the heading "Homestead exemp-
tion." 1 
§17.4. Inequality in assessment. In the headline-making1 decision 
in the Bettigole2 case, the city of Springfield's deliberate practice of 
assessing, for example, industrial property at 85 percent of fair cash 
value, while assessing one-family residences at 50 percent of fair cash 
value, was held to violate both the constitutional requirement for uni-
formity or proportionality in taxation3 and the statutory requirement 
for assessing all property at fair cash value.4 A detailed analysis of 
this case and similar ones in other states appears in Note, 75 Harvard 
Law Review 1374 (May, 1962). See also The Springfield Tax Deci-
sion: An Analysis of the Decision and Its Possible Effects, a pamphlet 
published by the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations. 
§17.5. Homestead exemption. In an advisory opinion a bill pro-
viding for a homestead exemption from property tax was held to vio-
late the same constitutional requirement for uniformity that was in-
volved in the Bettigole case above. 1 The bill would have granted to 
a legal resident of the state an exemption from property tax of up to 
$5000 worth of real property occupied by him. The resultant dis-
crimination against those who rent rather than own homes was an 
important facet of the Court's reasoning. 
§17.6. Minor's exemption. The exemption of $2000 worth of real 
property owned and occupied by a minor whose father is deceased and 
whose entire estate is less than $8000 was construed to be allowed 
only once for each parcel of real property. A parcel owned by three 
qualified minors as tenants in common was therefore entitled only to a 
$2000, not a $6000, exemption. 1 
§17.7. Appellate Tax Board jurisdiction. When the taxpayer, 
having elected to follow the informal procedure provided for under 
G.L., c. 58A, §7A, waives appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court except 
on questions of law, the implied finding by the Appellate Tax Board 
that no application for abatement had been filed will not be reviewed 
by the Court. Since the taxpayer must file an application for abate-
ment of property tax with the assessors in order for the Appellate Tax 
§17.3. 1 See §17.5 infra. 
§17.4. 1 See front page of any Boston newspaper for November 21, 1961, and im· 
mediately succeeding days. 
2 Bettigo1e v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10, 1 CCH Mass. 
Tax Cas. 1[200·131 (1961). 
3 Mass. Const., Part 2, c. 1, §1, Art. IV. 
4 G.L., c. 59, §38. 
§17.5. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 625, 181 N.E.2d 793, 1 CCH 
Mass. Tax Cas. 1[200·140. 
§17.6. 1 Sylvester v. Assessors of Braintree, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693,182 N.E.2d 120, 
1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. 1[200·141, also noted in §1.2 supra. 
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Board to have jurisdiction over the taxpayer's appeal from the asses-
sors' refusal to abate tax, it is proper for the board to dismiss the 
appeal.1 
§17.8. Nonavailability of declaratory relief. In 1953 and there-
after, as a result of Acts of 1953, c. 231, the taxpayer church was en-
titled to a $10,000 rather than a $5000 exemption on its parsonage. 
The increased exemption was neither claimed by the taxpayer nor 
proffered by the assessors for four years after 1953. When in 1960 the 
taxpayer filed a bill for declaratory relief under G.L., c. 231A, because 
it was too late to begin either a proceeding in abatement under G.L., 
c. 59, §§59-74, or an action to recover back taxes under G.L., c. 60, 
§98, the bill was dismissed and recovery of taxes paid denied.1 
§17.9. Sale of tax title by town. The mailing of a demand for pay-
ment of past due taxes to the wrong address does not invalidate a 
town's tax title, since an additional two years passed before the town 
could perfect its title during which time the owners must have known 
that taxes were to be paid. Also, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected 
an attempt to redeem based upon the objection that the Commissioner 
of Corporations and Taxation had incorrectly or unreasonably deter-
mined that the land was of low value, when all the requisite proce-
dures for the use of the administrative method of selling low value 
land had been followed by the town.1 
C. CORPORATION EXCISE TAX 
§17.10. Repeal of corporate excess measure and modification of 
tangible property measure. Chapter 756 of the Acts of 1962 swept 
away the long troublesome corporate excess measure of the corporation 
excise tax. The revenue lost thereby is to be made up by an increase 
in the rate of and other modifications of the tangible property measure 
of the tax and by increases in the minimum amount of tax due. How-
ever, a gradual rollback of the increase to the 1962 rate is provided 
for in the event that corporation excise tax revenues increase by more 
than $3,000,000 for each year after 1962. The first year for which the 
rollback might occur is the calendar year 1964, and for that there must 
by then have been an increase in revenues in excess of $6,000,000. 
The 1962 base revenue figure from which computations will be made 
is $101,303,902.1 
The act also provides for a five-year exemption from the tangible 
property measure for new and expanded investment in machinery and 
equipment having a useful life of eight years or more. Corporations 
§17.7. 1 Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 709, 182 N.E.2d 138. 
§17.8. 1 Second Church in Dorchester v. City of Boston, 343 Mass. 477, 179 N.E.2d 
598,1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. 11200-137 (1962). 
§17.9. 1 Johnson v. McMahon, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 791, 182 N.E.2d 507. 
§17.l0. 1 Comptroller's Bureau, Tax Reference Manual (15th ed., Dec. 1962). 
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having small amounts of tangible property are classified as "intangible 
property" corporations and are taxed on a book value net worth basis 
instead of the tangible property basis. An official summary of the 
act (and other legislative changes in the corporation excise tax) ap-
pears at 1[200-149 of 2 CCH Massachusetts State Tax Reporter. Also, 
the act was discussed by Owen L. Clarke, Chief of the Bureau of 
Corporations, in a speech delivered before the November 17, 1962, 
Institute of Taxation of Northeastern University, reprinted at 1[200-
153 of 2 CCH Massachusetts State Tax Reporter. Recent background 
studies leading to the adoption of the act are the two Special Reports 
of the State Tax Commission Relative to the Advisability of a More 
Simplified and Equitable Corporation Income Tax.2 
It is too soon to provide a critical analysis of this new legislation. 
As various technical problems arise, the State Tax Commission has 
let it be known that its response will be both prompt and clear. 
Those who observed the passage of this legislation through the Gen-
eral Court must have marveled at the lack of opposition and the gen-
erally smooth course the legislation took, considering its importance 
and the number of years during which repeal of the corporate excess 
measure has been sought. Lack of opposition is no doubt largely to 
be accounted for by the very modest increase in the rate applicable 
to tangible property (from $6.15 to $7.65 per $1000), the tantalizing 
promise of the rollback to the $6.15 rate, and possibly to the new 
property exemption feature. It is the latter feature that requires com-
ment. As a realistic matter, the exemption is unlikely to be the cause 
of new investment. The financial benefit, compared with the cost of 
the investment, is too small to be of consequence. (A saving of $7.65 
per $1000 for five years means 3.825 percent of cost at the most. But 
this must be reduced by depreciation after the first year and also by 
the effect on the amount of federal tax due. The net benefit can 
hardly be expected to exceed 1.5 to 2 percent of the original cost, and 
even this benefit is not to be received by the investor at the outset, 
but only in five annual, tiny instalments.) While some may view the 
advantage of the exemption as arising from its favorable effect on the 
"atmosphere" for investment or on the business climate,3 others quite 
properly may regard this kind of penny-ante tinkering as having just 
the opposite effect. For these reasons, plus the likely-to-arise technical 
problems of operating under the exemption (which, having been 
adopted prior to the Federal Revenue Act of 1962, could not be tech-
nically coordinated with its investment incentive provisions), one 
might hope for the repeal of the exemption. The revenue regained 
could hasten the day when the property measure returns to $6.15 or 
2 Senate Nos. 512 (Jan. 1961). 785 (May. 1962). 
S It has also been suggested by some that those who increase their investment be-
cause of the new federal investment credit still have to decide in which state to 
locate the new investment. While there may be an occasional instance where the 
tiny Massachusetts concession might influence a location decision, it is hard to be-
lieve that the revenue lost by the concession in general will be worth the investment 
gain achieved by such an occasional instance. 
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lower and thereby benefit all business firms rather than only a few. 
§17.11. Corporate excess (former law): Allocation of intangibles of 
foreign corporation. The use by the Commissioner of the net income 
allocation formula to determine the 1955 Massachusetts' allocation 
of a foreign corporation's intangibles for the purpose of the corporate 
excess measure was upheld as fair and appropriate for a taxpayer en-
gaged in the sales financing business in twenty-six states. This result 
has been authorized by statute since Acts of 1960, c. 548, §3.1 
§17.12. Corporate excess (former law): Valuation of capital stock, 
The Commissioner may determine the fair value of the capital stock 
of a corporation for purposes of computing corporate excess by any 
method the Commissioner regards as appropriate and need not follow 
the valuation method set forth in its tax forms and instruction sheets. 
Therefore, the Commissioner may use the market value of the tax-
payer's stock as an element in establishing the fair value of that stock. 
Also, the Appellate Tax Board may likewise determine fair value of 
capital stock according to a reasonable method and need not follow 
the Commissioner's method even if that is reasonable too. The rea-
sonable method followed by the board will be upheld by the Supreme 
Judicial Court against a challenge by the commission based on the 
reasonableness of its own method, since the board is the final step in 
the administrative process.1 
§17.13. Allocation of income. An extensive discussion of current 
problems in the allocation of income to Massachusetts under the in-
come measure of the corporation excise tax was provided by Owen L. 
Clarke, Chief of the Bureau of Corporations, in a speech before the 
November 18, 1961, Institute of Taxation of Northeastern University. 
The speech was reprinted at ~200-143 of 2 CCH Massachusetts State 
Tax Reporter. 
D. PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
§17.14. Legislation. The November, 1962, defeat of the proposed 
constitutional amendment for a graduated income tax has already 
been mentioned. Several months prior to the referendum it was held 
that expenditures made by a corporation to bring about the defeat of 
the proposed amendment were neither ultra vires acts nor a violation 
of G.L., c. 55, §7, which prevents use of corporate funds to influence 
voters in certain cases.1 New legislation affecting the personal income 
tax included measures (1) to conform to the federal statute the tax 
treatment of recipients of General Motors stock from duPont pur-
§17.11. 1 Allied Building Credits, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 1962 Mass. Adv. 
Sh.973, 183 N.E.2d 281, 1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. 11200-146. 
§17.12. 1 State Tax Commission v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
933. 182 N.E.2d 819, 1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. 11200-144. 
§17.I4. 1 Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1151, 183 N.E.2d 871. also 
noted in §18.l1 infra. 
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suant to the anti-trust decree, and (2) to grant exemption from income 
tax with respect to income received by retired United States Govern-
ment employees from Government retirement funds to which they 
contributed. These measures are described in the department's Tech-
nical Discussion of 1962 Personal Income Tax Legislation, which is 
reprinted at ~200-148 of 2 CCH Massachusetts State Tax Reporter; 
§17.15. Dividend from realty trust. Income received in 1951 as a 
dividend by a shareholder in a realty trust was held exempt because 
it was derived entirely from profits made by the trust on sales of real 
estate.1 It should be noted that the exemption for real estate income 
which appears in G.L., c. 62, §22(a), was more general in 1951 than it 
now is. Acts of 1954, c. 611, §2, amended the wording so as largely 
to limit the exemption to income derived from rentals of real estate.2 
§17.16. Deduction of federal income tax paid. The taxpayer's 
payment in 1956 of the balance of federal income tax owing on 1955 
income was held not to be the payment of a deficiency and therefore 
could not be deducted from 1956 Massachusetts income under G.L., 
c. 62, §6(c), as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 517.1 It was in 1956 that 
the deduction for federal income tax was changed from the federal 
tax payments made during the year to the federal tax due with respect 
to income earned during the year, plus federal deficiency payments 
made during the year on account of prior years, less similar refunds. 
The term "deficiency" was held to have the same meaning for pur-
poses of Section 6(c) as it does under Section 6211 of the federal Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, a meaning which excludes a mere unpaid 
balance of tax due. 
E. THE WHEATLAND CASE 
§17.17. Taxation of income from out-of-state property. In State 
Tax Commission v. Wheatland,1 the taxpayer was a co-owner of un-
divided interests in forest lands located in Maine. He and many of 
the other co-owners each gave powers of attorney to an agent in Maine 
for the purpose of handling timber operations on the lands. During 
the calendar years 1953 through 1956 the taxpayer received payments 
through the agent from the loggers who had contracted to cut and 
pay for timber pursuant to a detailed "Memorandum of an Agree-
ment and Conditional License." 2 The payments were net, since the 
agent had deducted all expenses. In 1955 the taxpayer also received 
payments resulting from the sale by him, not the agent, of part of the 
§17.15. 1 State Tax Commission v. Colbert, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 96!!, 18!! N.E.2d 
277, I CCH Mass. Tax Cas. ~200-145. 
2 A very important case, Wheatland, which also deals with real estate income, is 
discussed at length in §17.17 infra. 
§17.16. 1 Farwell v. State Tax Commission, !!4!! Mass. 116, 177 N.E.2d 582, 1 CCH 
Mass. Tax Cas. ~200-1!!0 (1961). 
§17.17. 1!j4!! Mass. 650, 180 N.E.2d !!4Q, I CCH Mass. Tax Cas. ~200-1!!9 (1962). 
2 Record, p. 25. 
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taxpayer's interests in the forest lands. The Commissioner of Corpo-
rations and Taxation sought to tax under the "business income" cate-
gory the income from timber operations and the gain from the sale of 
taxpayer's interests in land. The Supreme Judicial Court held that 
neither the timber income nor the land gain was subject to Massachu-
setts income tax. 
The taxpayer's brief was devoted largely to arguing that it was un-
constitutional for Massachusetts to tax out-of-state tangible or real 
property. The taxpayer sought to establish (1) that according to Mas-
sachusetts law the income tax was a property tax, (2) that the charac-
terization by Massachusetts would be binding on the United States 
Supreme Court, and (3) that that Court has consistently held it a vio-
lation of the Federal Constitution for a state to apply a property tax 
to out-of-state tangible or real property. This line of argument was 
designed to defeat the income tax on both items - the timber income 
and the land gain. The taxpayer also advanced separate arguments 
against each of the two items. The additional arguments to defeat 
the tax on the timber income were that he was not carrying on a trade 
or business and that unconstitutional discrimination would result from 
taxing income from Maine forest land at a rate different from that 
applied to Massachusetts forest land, which is taxed under Chapter 61 
of the General Laws rather than Chapter 62. The additional argument 
against the land gain was that the isolated nature of the sale prevented 
it from constituting business income. 
The Commissioner's brief argued (1) that income from the sale of 
out-of-state tangible personal property (timber) was included under 
the statute, (2) that gain from the sale of out-of-state real estate was 
included under the statute, and (3) that both the timber income and 
the land gain could constitutionally be taxed. 
The Appellate Tax Board agreed with the Commissioner with re-
spect to the timber income and noted that the taxpayer received the 
income in Massachusetts, thus giving the income (which was property) 
a Massachusetts and therefore taxable situs.s The board agreed with 
the taxpayer with respect to the land gain, but on the ground that the 
legislature did not intend the statute applicable during 1955 to reach 
isolated sales. 
The Supreme Judicial Court devoted most of its opinion to an 
analysis of the possible constitutional bar against applying the tax 
to out-of-state property. Concluding that the Federal Constitution 
might well bar the tax, the Court went to some trouble to interpret 
the statute so as not to apply to the timber income. The constitu-
tional issue was thereby avoided, but provided the excuse for the inter-
pretation with respect to the timber income. The interpretation was 
not founded on argument advanced in the taxpayer's brief. As for 
S This rationale is similar to the "remittance" basis of taxation, which is used on 
occasion in several countries of the world. See, e.g., Harvard Law School Inter-
national Program in Taxation, Taxation in Brazil §llJ2.2 (Gumpel and de Sousa, 
1957); Taxation in the United Kingdom §llJ2.8 (Brudno and Bower, 1957). 
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the land gain, which is discussed at some length toward the end of 
this analysis, the Court agreed with the board and found it unneces-
sary to lean on the Constitution for support. 
It is difficult to interpret the statutory language4 in such a manner 
that it should exempt the out-of-state timber income. The Court did 
so by analogizing timber income to real estate rental income, which is 
specifically exempt from taxation. The analogy, of course, is appli-
cable whether the timber is within or without Massachusetts, and the 
Court so stated. But the Court went on to hold only as follows: 
" ... we are of the opinion that these provisions [§§5(b) and 6 of G.L., 
c. 62], in order to avoid constitutional doubts, should be construed 
as not taxing the proceeds of the sale of timber located in Maine." I) 
There is no indication in the opinion or in the briefs as to what policy 
motive might have induced the legislature to exempt the out-of-state 
timber income. Indeed, the opposite would seem to be the case. A 
Massachusetts inhabitant has for many years had to pay income tax on 
his farm income,6 which is much more analogous to timber income 
than real estate income is, and in any event is entitled to credit against 
his Massachusetts income tax for the income tax he might have to 
pay to the state where the timber is located.7 Moreover, if the Court's 
4 The statutes applicable for 195!1 were C.L., c. 62, §§5 (as amended by Acts of 
19!19, c. 486, §l) and 6: 
§5. "Income of the following classes received by any inhabitant of the common-
wealth during the preceding calendar year shall be taxed as follows: ... 
"(b) The excess over two thousand dollars of the income, as defined in section six, 
derived from ... trade or business shall be taxed at the rate of one and one half 
per cent per annum ... " 
§6. "Income taxable under subsection (b) of section five shall be the gross income 
from the ... trade or business, ... not including income exempt from taxation 
under this chapter or taxable hereunder otherwise than under said subsection (b), 
but including gains from the sale of capital assets, other than intangible personal 
property, employed therein; less the following deductions: ... " 
The statutes applicable for 1954·1956 were C.L., c. 62: 
§5 (as amended by Acts of 1954, c. 679, §4). "Income of the following classes 
received by any inhabitant of the commonwealth during the preceding calendar year 
shall be taxed as follows: . . . 
"(b) The excess of the income derived from ... trade or business as defined in 
section six . . . shall be taxed at the rate of one and one half per cent per 
annum ... " 
§6 (as amended by Acts of 1954, c. 611, §l). "Income taxable under subsection 
(b) of section five shall be the net income from the ... trade or business in the 
year for which the income is computed. Income from, payments for the use of, or 
gains from sales or exchanges of any personal tangible or intangible property and 
gains from sales or exchanges of real estate, except income, payment or gains, which 
are specifically taxed or exempted under a section or subsection of this chapter 
other than subsection (b) of section five shall constitute income from the trade or 
business of the taxpayer. The net income from the ... trade or business shall be 
the gross income derived therefrom less the following deductions: ... " 
I) !l4!1 Mass. 650, 65!1, 180 N.E.2d !l40, !l42, 1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. 1I200.1!l9, last page 
(1962). 
6 Whipple v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 26!1 Mass. 476, 161 N.E. 
59!1 (1928). See also C.L., c. 62B, §15, added by Acts of 1959, c. 17. 
7 C.L., c. 62, §6A, added by Acts of 1955, c. 780, effective as to income for 1955 and 
subsequent years. 
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interpretation stands, difficult problems of limiting its effect will arise. 
Will the exemption apply only to out-of-state property, as the above-
quoted statement from the opinion might indicate, or will the exemp-
tion extend to similar kinds of property within Massachusetts, as one 
commentator believes? 8 Consider also the problem of deciding to 
which kinds of property the exemption will apply. For example, will 
income from the sale of the following be exempt: sweet corn from a 
New Hampshire farm owned by a Massachusetts inhabitant or or-
anges from a similarly owned Florida grove; new automobiles sold 
and delivered in Rhode Island by a Boston dealer; groceries sold by 
a Massachusetts inhabitant in the store he operates summers in Maine; 
or, to get to some more serious matters, oil and other minerals located 
in other states, but owned in whole or in part by Massachusetts in-
habitants? 
On the question under the Federal Constitution, perhaps the Su-
preme Judicial Court was misled by the following statement in the 
taxpayer's brief concerning the limited role of the United States Su-
preme Court in characterizing or designating a tax as an income tax 
or a property tax: "When a federal constitutional question is involved, 
such as the extra-territorial issue in these cases, the designation by the 
highest court of the state is controlling as to the operation and inci-
dence of the state tax in question. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 606 (1951)." 9 The Commissioner's brief did 
not allude to this point at all, although it may have been discussed at 
the oral argument. There have been many cases in which the United 
States Supreme Court has stated it would not follow state characteriza-
tion and will itself look past labels at the practical operation of a tax.10 
The Spector case,n the single case relied upon in taxpayer's brief on 
the question of characterization as a property tax, did not involve a 
property tax versus income tax controversy but rather a reaffirmation 
of the Supreme Court's long-time constitutional ban on state taxes of 
any kind on the privilege of doing interstate business within a state. 
The privilege cases have a history of their own and cannot safely be 
regarded as a reliable guide to cases such as Wheatland. 
If the United States Supreme Court had had an opportunity to look 
past the labels in the Wheatland case, it would have discovered that 
the Massachusetts tax sought to be applied to the timber income and 
the land gain operated in accord with common conceptions of an 
income tax. Deductions for expenses, depletion, cost, etc., were all 
8 Note, 43 B.U.L. Rev. 153 (1963). 
9 Taxpayer's brief, p. 9. 
10 See. e.g .• Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489. 493. 78 Sup. Ct. 458, 
461. 2 L. Ed. 2d 441, 446 (1958); Nelson v. Sears. Roebuck &: Co .• 312 U.S. 359, 363. 
61 Sup. Ct. 586. 588. 85 L. Ed. 888. 891 (1941); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co .• 311 
U.s. 435. 443. 61 Sup. Ct. 246. 249. 85 L. Ed. 267. 270 (1940); Lawrence v. State Tax 
Commission of Mississippi. 286 U.S. 276. 280. 52 Sup. Ct. 556. 557. 76 L. Ed. 1102, 
1106 (1932). 
11 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602. 606. 71 Sup. Ct. 508, 
510, 95 L. Ed. 573. 577 (1951). 
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allowed in computing income subject to tax. Nothing turned on 
whether the taxpayer owned the income-producing property on tax-
listing day for property tax purposes. Many of the differences be-
tween a property tax and an income tax were discussed in New York 
ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,12 which upheld the application of New York's 
income tax to rental income from real estate located outside New 
York State and which upon its facts and reasoning lends solid consti-
tutional support to the Massachusetts income tax. 
The United States Supreme Court might also have traced back the 
Massachusetts Court's decisions holding the Massachusetts income tax 
to be a property tax, in order to see for what purposes such a char-
acterization might have been relevant. The Massachusetts opinion 
most frequently quoted fromlS was handed down on April 12, 1915, 
about seven months prior to voter ratification of the Forty-fourth 
Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, the amendment au-
thorizing the income tax. This opinion advised the legislature that 
proposed legislation to tax income from intangible personal property 
instead of the fair cash value of that property would violate the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution's requirement for proportionality or uniform-
ity of taxation. A 1921 case,14 also frequently cited, held that a 
taxpayer who moved into the state in January, 1918, could not be 
required to pay income tax based upon 1917 income. In so holding 
the Massachusetts Court found it helpful to identify the tax as a prop-
erty tax, rather than an excise tax, in order to assert that liability for 
the tax arose when the property (the income) passed into the hands 
of the person entitled to it. The fact that the recipient did not have 
to pay over the tax to the state until required to file a return of in-
come in the following year was a matter of administrative convenience. 
In 1926 another caselli refined this timing concept still further and 
construed the income tax statute not to apply to income unless earned 
while and after a taxpayer became a Massachusetts inhabitant. In 
1931 the property tax label was used in connection with the taxation 
of a trust with transferable shares.16 The trust owned improved real 
estate and had filed with the Commissioner the agreement under G.L., 
c. 62, §1(1)(d) and (e), in order to relieve shareholders of any tax lia-
bility on the ground that the trust would pay any tax due. The Com-
missioner attempted to apply the income tax to the trust's real estate 
rental income, though he had not done so from 1916 to 1930, and the 
Court held that the real estate income exemption in G.L., c. 62, §22, 
applied to the income of the trust. None of these cases, all of which 
identify the Massachusetts income tax as a property tax for one pur-
12 300 U.S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466,81 L. Ed. 666 (1937). 
18 Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 570 (1915). 
14 Hart v. Tax Commissioner, 240 Mass. 37, 132 N.E. 621 (1921). 
III Kennedy v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, ·256 Mass. 426, 152 
N.E. 747 (1926). 
16 DeBlois v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 276 Mass. 437, 177 N.E. 
566 (1931). 
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pose or another, provide a basis for the concern of the Massachusetts 
Court in Wheatland over the possibility that the United States Su-
preme Court would declare the Massachusetts income tax unconstitu-
tional as applied to income from property in Maine. 
While we are dealing with constitutional matters, we might exam-
ine the constitutional aspect of the other income item in the Wheat-
land case, the land gain resulting from the taxpayer's sale of a portion 
of his interest in Maine forest lands which he received by inheritance 
or gift. The Massachusetts Court stated in effect in the next to 
the last paragraph of its Wheatland opinion that it need not decide 
whether the concern the Court showed over the constitutionality of 
applying the Massachusetts income tax to the timber income should 
also be shown with respect to the land gain. Citing Willcuts v. 
Bunnp the Court said that different considerations might conceiva-
bly apply to the land gain situation. Apparently the Court had in 
mind the possibility, not raised in the briefs, that the gain on the 
land sale was analogous to the gain on the sale of municipal bonds 
involved in the Willcuts case. There, though the bond interest in-
come (presumably analogous to timber income) was immune from fed-
eral income taxation, it was held that the gain on the sale of the bond 
was taxable. The Massachusetts Court, thus leaving open the possi-
bility that Massachusetts might constitutionally tax the land gain but 
not the timber income, goes on to interpret the statute in the light 
of its legislative history in a manner to preclude the statute's applica-
tion to isolated gains. 
The construction adopted seems an unlikely one had there been no 
recommendation of the State Tax Commission to cite as a reason for 
the enactment of the 1954 amendment.18 The amended statute states 
that " ... gains from sales or exchanges of real estate ... shall con-
stitute income from the trade or business of the taxpayer." 19 The 
recommendation, which followed the decision in the Gardiner case,20 
asked that a loophole be plugged with respect to taxing income of 
those engaged in developing real estate for purpose of sale to the pub-
lic and those engaged in buying and selling real estate for profit. The 
recommendation provided for an exclusion for income from sale of 
principal dwelling units. Taken as a whole, the recommendation and 
the amendment itself seem to indicate an intention to tax all gains 
from the sale of real estate except those resulting from the sale of tax-
payer's principal residence. Such an intention is the more logical to 
impute since it avoids difficult determinations of taxpayer intentions 
with respect to real property which he holds and later sells. More-
11282 U.S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. Ed. 304 (1931). 
18 See 1954 House Doc. No. 89, Recommendation 18 (reproduced on the next to 
the last page of the Appellate Tax Board's opinion in the Wheatland case, 1 CCH 
Mass. Tax Cas. ~200-122 (1960». For the 1954 amendment to the income tax statute, 
see Acts of 1954, c. 611. 
19 G.L., c. 62, §6, as amended by Acts of 1954, c. 611, §1. 
20 Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Gardiner, 329 Mass. 654, 110 
N.E.2d 106 (1953). 
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over, from the earliest days of the Massachusetts income tax it has 
been held that the concept of income was intended to be broad.21 
While the Court did interpret the statute as amended in 1954 to 
exclude taxation of isolated gains, the Court specifically refrained 
from expressing any view of the taxability of such gains under the 
statute as amended in 1957,22 which reads in part as follows, the sig-
nificant new words being italicized: "The business income taxable 
under . . . shall be the net income from the profession, employment, 
trade or business and from transactions entered into for profit . . ." 
This new language would seem not to exempt casual and isolated sales 
in general, since such transactions might well have been originally en-
tered into for profit. However, the narrower question presented by 
the Wheatland facts is whether the sale of inherited property falls 
within the new statutory language.23 On this question the length of 
time during which the inherited property is held and the use to which 
it is put would both be relevant at least to any gain accruing subse-
quent to the acquisition. Some guidance as to the interpretation of 
the "transactions entered into for profit" phrase may also be found in 
federal income tax law, where the provision relating to losses deducti-
ble by individuals has for many years contained the identical words.24 
In the federal situation it has been in the taxpayer's interest to have 
a finding that the transaction has been entered into for profit, since 
the loss deduction would then be allowed. The taxpayer has gen-
erally been successful in obtaining the loss deduction with respect to 
property received by inheritance or gift.211 
The combination of the 1957 change in the statute, the use to which 
the property has been put, and the federal interpretations of the new 
Massachusetts language all make it almost certain that Mr. Wheatland 
will have the Commissioner asking for tax when he next sells any of 
his interest in inherited Maine land; also the Massachusetts Court may 
well find that the statute no longer excludes the land gain. Thus the 
constitutional issue on the land gain will have to be faced, unless once 
again the Court uses it to force an exclusionary interpretation of the 
statute. 
The Wheatland case has raised some very important questions for 
Massachusetts income tax law. It has not, however, resolved all of 
21 Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904 (1917). The opinion 
in this case is careful to remind us of the circumstances under which the Massachu-
setts income tax amendment was adopted in 1915, especially the fact that the United 
States income tax of 1913 was already in effect with its broad and inclusive concept 
of income. 
22 Acts of 1957, c. 677, §5. 
23 There is an unresolved question of fact in the Wheatland record on this point, 
since some of the taxpayer's interests in the Maine land may have been acquired 
other than by inheritance or gift. The stipulated facts say only that the interests 
were acquired "principally by gift and inheritance." Record, p. 10. 
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §165(c)(2). Note that here the word "transaction" is in 
the singular. . 
211 The question is discussed and many of the cases cited in Bittker, Federal In· 
come, Estate and Gift Taxation 207-208 (2d ed. 1958). 
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them by any means. New litigation may be expected with respect to 
all types of out-of-state income which have any relation to property. 
Some one of these is likely to find the Massachusetts Court supporting 
taxability. In such a case the taxpayer, buttressed by years of Massa-
chusetts Court characterization of the Massachusetts income tax as a 
property tax, may decide to bring the matter before the United States 
Supreme Court and get a decision on constitutional grounds on facts 
similar to the timber income issue in Wheatland. 
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